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Abstract: The article addresses the diplomacy practiced by Sir Stanley Rous, FIFA president (1961-
1974), and the international history of DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) involvement 
in, and the boycott by African nations of, the 1966 World Cup in light of a number of newly available 
primary sources. The new materials reveal firstly, Rous’s diplomatic practice and the tension between 
formal and informal diplomacy he pursued; and secondly the disquiet in London over North Korean 
participation, a problem relieved in great part by Rous’s interventions. Concerns over anthems, 
protocol, and flags, were mediated by Rous as he negotiated with the British foreign policy-making 
establishment from his position as FIFA president. The analysis illuminates the negotiation, 
representation and communication underpinning the diplomacy of the 1966 World Cup. Rous was 
also influential, though to contrasting effect, in the case of the opposition of the Confédération 
Africaine de Football (CAF) to apartheid in South Africa and CAF’s support for the emerging pan-
African cause. The article offers new insights into the diplomatic role of Rous and FIFA, and throws 
light upon the tension between formal and informal diplomatic practices underlying the staging of a 








The Fédération Internationale de Football Association’s (FIFA’s) first World Championship, to 
become known in the post-1945 era as the World Cup, was staged in Uruguay in 1930 when the hosts 
– Olympic football champions in 1924 and 1928 – took the title.1 The previous year FIFA had 
celebrated its 25-year anniversary with a celebratory paeon to the values of the expanding 
organisation in the form of a book outlining its essential mission from the perspective of its key 
stakeholders. These were neither the players nor the fans but its administrators. In this volume FIFA 
president, Jules Rimet, described football as ‘the chivalry of modern times’.2 Belgian Rodolphe 
Seeldrayers, FIFA president from 1955-56, also contributed, writing that national associations and 
federations could be strong and secure only if ‘under the aegis of a strong and respected international 
federation’.3 He added that international football conducted in ‘an atmosphere of high sporting spirit’ 
can create for both spectators and players ‘a state of mind/soul superior to that resulting from the 
weekly struggle for a [national] championship’.4 In this Seeldrayers argues that international football 
had the capacity to transcend national issues under FIFA’s aegis, pre-empting both the tension that Sir 
Stanley Rous would face as president and the consequent diplomacy of 1966. Rimet and Seeldrayers 
preached a creed - and preach they did in almost biblical terms - that was steeped in the nineteenth-
century Corinthian philosophy of fair play and athleticism. Such a view of sport illustrated the tension 
between national and international realms and was to become increasingly important as FIFA’s 
profile grew alongside the consolidation of its major asset, the FIFA World Cup.   
The creed of the early FIFA leaders was also the framing philosophy of Englishman Sir 
Stanley Rous (1895-1986), who was FIFA president from 1961 to 1974. In this position - tarnished in 
the twenty-first century by the corrupt practices of Sepp Blatter - Rous faced a series of challenges 
concerning the balance of power between Europe, South America, and the emerging post-colonial 
world.5  These challenges reflected international affairs of the 1950s and 1960s and intensified in the 
run up to the 1966 World Cup finals in England, hosted by The Football Association (FA). In the 
build-up to the event Rous was immersed in discussion and decision-making of import for FIFA far 
beyond what would happen on the field of play. It is from such a perspective that this article explores 




In exploring the international history of sport and international affairs the article makes three 
new and interrelated contributions. First, it revisits the story of North Korea’s participation in the 
1966 World Cup Finals tournament; second, it explores the non-participation of African nations in the 
1966 World Cup as an example of the sporting boycott – the only one the FIFA World Cup has 
suffered;6 and third, running across the previous two, it demonstrates the significance of the role 
played by Rous as both official and unofficial diplomat. The analysis presented in this article is not 
explicitly a study of the Cold War nor of pan-African history. It does nevertheless contribute to an 
enhanced understanding of the breadth of the multidimensional Cold War – the Global Cold as Odd 
Arne Westad termed it – in spheres such as international sport;7 and recognises an underplayed 
element in the emergence of organised pan-African strategies and initiatives. The analyses of the 
DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and CAF (Confédération Africaine de Football) 
experiences of the 1966 World Cup are connected to their broader contexts so reaffirming the socio-
political and diplomatic significance of the practices and interventions of institutional actors in the 
international sporting world. The analyses illustrate new historical insight into the operation of an 
international federation in the light of the overarching geopolitical realities of the Cold War and pan-
Africanism, and Rous’s diplomatic practice in those contexts. Here the diplomatic background to the 
North Korean presence at World Cup ‘66 is depicted in more layered depth than hitherto understood; 
and the CAF boycott of the tournament can now be told in the light of previously understated 
negotiations that took place, and contemporaneous perspectives provided by the voices of indigenous 
sources.  
Rous saw himself as a bastion of complementary Corinthian, British and Olympic values; and 
in his presidential role at FIFA as a diplomat for football. It was in his role as FIFA president that his 
own approach to diplomacy can be clearly seen as it impacts upon the 1966 World Cup. Self-styled, 
and only occasionally reflective of his role, Rous’s diplomatic practice was that of an objective 
independent adjudicator which could arbitrate between different points of view and prevent conflict 
escalating. In short, he sought to be a diplomat in the manner of the international referee he had been 
previously. Whether in direct contact with ‘formal’ diplomatic actors in the shape of the Foreign 




ambassador’ according to the Labour British sports minister Denis Howell (1964-70 and again 1974-
79).8 Tensions nevertheless existed in Rous’s diplomatic outlook and application from the outset and 
were distinct from his approach to FIFA leadership. His ‘laid-back’ diplomatic style and ‘unfailingly 
good manners’ served to attract ‘people to him and created confidence’.9 It was therefore difficult, if 
not impossible for him to escape the vestiges of his high office, in which his leadership retained the 
traits of his schoolmasterly training to preach and instruct. So whilst his diplomatic style may have 
been informal, his position was formal, and whilst his character meant he was approachable, he also 
had the capacity to instruct. So, although Howell’s analysis suggests Rous ‘did not assert himself 
unduly but he attracted great respect’ his failure to accurately read and respond to the changing nature 
of global affairs meant his approach was outmoded by the time the England team lifted the Jules 
Rimet trophy in July 1966. Myopia on the issue of South African apartheid was not only distasteful to 
many in Africa and beyond then and now, but almost as soon as he became President, these views 
undermined his position. Brazil’s João Havelange was ready to exploit this in campaigning against 
Rous and ultimately defeating him for the FIFA presidency in the 1974 election.  
 By then Rous had been on a remarkable journey from modest roots in Mutford, Suffolk, to 
being trained as a schoolteacher and physical educationalist while also becoming an outstanding 
international football referee. He moved professionally from schoolmastering to football 
administration when becoming secretary of The Football Association (FA) in 1934, a post he held for 
28 years up to and beyond the point of his election as FIFA president, and was knighted in 1949 for 
services to charity and sport including his instrumental contribution to the organization of the first 
post-war summer Olympic Games in London in 1948.  
Underpinning his approach and practice Rous had a sacred belief that there should be a 
separation of sport and politics. The latter he saw in national statist terms, immune to the notion that 
politics was at play in other realms. His belief in the separation of sport and politics, shared by many 
at the time and since, was dogma when it came to issues such as addressing apartheid South Africa. In 
pursuing the separation of sport and politics - deconstructed by Lincoln Allison as a ‘myth of 
autonomy’- Rous’s approach was flawed.10 In one address to an early CAF meeting he proclaimed: 




with politics, we should not criticise the decision taken and Politics must not interfere with our 
activities.’11 Rous’s words reveal a naivety that would challenge the application of his diplomatic 
practice in relation to both CAF priorities and North Korean qualification for the 1966 Finals. The 
failing in Rous’s approach was to think that football could operate without influence from the geo-
political environment of the Cold War and of the decolonising environment of the 1950s and 1960s.  
In each of the three dimensions that shape the article, analysis is supported by newly available 
original primary source material, comprising previously unseen archive material from the private 
papers of Stanley Rous, and oral history transcripts of interviews with protagonists featured in BBC 
World Service coverage of the African boycott.12 Rous’s private papers, for several decades in the 
custody of his former secretary and assistant, complement public records consulted at the National 
Archives (Kew, London), and materials archived in the FIFA Museum and Library (Zurich). Further, 
the article draws upon and complements recent literature that has brought together the study of sport 
in all its dimensions in international affairs in the emergent field of sport and diplomacy. This body of 
academic literature is consciously multidisciplinary, encompassing conceptual and empirical work on 
particular historical events, configurations and phases; it embraces a raft of recent publications which 
have recognised sport as a serious and substantial subject of historical study.13 This takes history 
beyond the subfield of ‘sport history’ and acknowledges the connectedness of forms of sport and 
diplomacy within the wider fields of global history, international history and diplomatic history.14 
 
1. A World Cup debut: The North Korean case  
The 1962 World Cup Finals tournament in Chile featured 16 national teams, ten from Europe, five 
from South America, and Mexico from FIFA’s grouping of central America and the Caribbean. No 
team from the African or Asian continents qualified for the event. It was the last World Cup Finals at 
which the championship was contested by only nations from Europe or the Americas. For 1966, just 
one place was offered the two confederations representing Asia and Africa, to be competed for across 
not only the two continents but also Oceania’s South Pacific region which included the Dominions of 
Australia and New Zealand (Oceania was not a fully, formally constituted confederation until 15 




offer, with CAF withdrawing en masse from the qualifying competition after FIFA failed to respond 
to its ultimatum over allocation of places at the World Cup finals tournament. Only two countries, one 
from the Asian confederation and the other from the fledgling Oceania grouping, were left to contest 
this single slot in the event.  
The 1966 World Cup finals tournament therefore comprised ten European teams, four from 
South America, one from the central Americas/Caribbean, and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), or ‘North Korea’ as the country was more colloquially known across the world. In 
Phnom-Penh, Cambodia, in November 1965, North Korea had faced Australia in a two-match play-
off for the final place for the tournament. The over-confident Australians were humiliated, losing both 
games, 6-1 and then 3-1, in a 9-2 aggregate defeat. 
Martin Polley has previously provided a dedicated account of the ‘diplomatic background’ to 
the North Korea question at the 1966 World Cup, based on his careful reading of Foreign Office and 
related documents in the National Archives (London, UK), though Rous’s role in resolving diplomatic 
crises remains relatively neglected.15 Polley’s balanced analysis focusing upon the state’s 
involvement confirms the seriousness with which British government personnel, ‘Whitehall officials’ 
as he describes them, approached the North Korea issue but overlooks Rous’s individual role. The 
Whitehall officials contextualised DPRK’s participation within the broad Cold War setting of the Two 
Koreas and the Two Germanys. His concluding analysis shows, first, that events such as a World Cup 
are recognized as significant by government; second, that appropriate branches of government have 
the capacity to work with sport administrators ‘despite the difference in remit and agenda’; third, that 
sport could not be immune from ‘the complexity and magnitude’ of the UK’s Cold War diplomacy; 
and finally, that the diplomatic background that shaped the political response to North Korea’s 
qualification for 1966 involved ‘machinations’ that were ‘hidden from public view’.16 What Polley’s 
interpretation of the official Foreign Office (FO) papers does not show is the nature and scale of those 
‘machinations’ which were carried out by Rous operating in the space between formal and informal 
diplomacy. Rous features only twice in Polley’s study: first, appearing as an invitee to an early 
consideration of the issues by the Foreign Office in December 1965; and second, in relation to the 




Office’s Far Eastern Department (25 March 1966) in which Bolland also expressed his sympathy over 
the loss of the World Cup trophy.17 Rous was more deeply involved than this though in the diplomacy 
of the 1966 World Cup, acting on behalf of the Foreign Office on occasion, as his newly uncovered 
private papers reveal alongside a number of little-cited and overlooked files in the National Archive 
(Kew, London). Rous’s involvement centred not only on the DPRK and the African boycott but also 
and equally significantly for this analysis on his diplomatic role in advancing FIFA’s overall interests. 
Polley notes that papers from the Department of Education and Science (DES) concerning the North 
Korean issue were not traceable, and ‘proved impossible to locate’ in the National Archives,18 while 
the new access to documents in the private papers of Rous confirm the extent of his role in 
negotiations that determined the outcome of the North Korean problem. 
 North Korea was an unwanted guest at FIFA’s football party in the eyes of the British 
political and diplomatic establishment which was concerned from the outset at the implications of a 
North Korean presence for the United Kingdom’s strategic Cold War relationships. Following North 
Korea’s qualification the Foreign Office began to consider the diplomatic implications of participation 
by an unrecognised country. North Korea was technically still at war with its southern neighbour – the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea), to whom the United Kingdom had provided military support 
numbering almost 100,000 troops and its fleet in the Far East in support of a US-led United Nations 
force, during the Korean War 1950-1953.19 Within diplomatic, political and military circles DPRK 
involvement was a major issue, and provides a revealing case study of the diplomatic challenges of 
the time, and Rous’s efforts to resolve them.  
When Rous became FIFA president in 1961, he recognised the opportunity to shape football’s 
place in international affairs that this platform provided. He declared that there has ‘never been a 
more exciting time in football as an international game’; dozens of newly independent countries in 
Africa and Asia ‘have clamoured for membership of F.I.F.A. and a place in the international football 
sun’.20 It was FIFA’s ‘great challenge’, Rous observed, to help ‘organize their game in every possible 
sense.’ Revealing his Corinthian paternalism on behalf of FIFA to guide worldwide football 
development, and his conviction in the separation of sport and politics, he continued ‘they have to be 




football nations above and beyond and apart from any political considerations’.21 North Korea’s 
qualification presented Rous with the opportunity to put his principles into practice as a diplomat who 
could meld the realms of sport and politics while disavowing the connection between a range of 
stakeholders: The Football Association (The FA); FIFA; North Korea’s national association as a 
member of FIFA; and the Foreign Office, involving the Secretary of State and the Far Eastern 
Department, along with other ministerial departments in the British government. Such a melange of 
actors is now recognised in the sport diplomacy field, but to acknowledge as much at the time would 
have been to undermine the belief in the separation of sport and politics. Nonetheless, Rous situated 
himself firmly in the midst of these different stakeholders and this allowed his brand of diplomatic 
practice to unfold with mixed results.  
Evidence of Rous’s diplomatic practice can be seen in the invitation he and The FA’s 
secretary general Denis Follows received to the Foreign Office for a meeting on 14 December 1965.22  
While Polley acknowledges their presence as ‘interested parties’ to discuss DPRK involvement his 
account does not then include detailed consideration of Rous’s contribution at that meeting and his 
ongoing role as informal diplomat for the Foreign Office in addressing the matter.23 In this December 
meeting the broader Cold War context was to the fore as was Rous’s capacity to engage in a brand of 
personal diplomacy as three aspects of North Korean participation emerged as cause for concern. The 
concerns were over the playing of national anthems, the language to be used to describe the North 
Korean team, and the flying of participants’ flags at the stadiums. A compromise on the issues of 
anthems and language was proposed to Rous to reconcile Foreign Office concerns and FIFA protocols  
The compromise was a recommendation that the national anthems of the two competing countries 
should be played at the opening and final matches only; no anthems played at any other of the other 
matches; and in all official publications, ‘the name of the participating country … would be North 
Korea’. The calculation here, expressing the desire not to convey official state recognition, was that 
the North Korean anthem would never be played. Rous’s longhand annotation on Fellows’s report 
observed that ‘There may be others’ [as well as North Korea] ‘who will not like the arrangement’.24 
The ‘others’ that those gathered in December 1965 were contemplating were the Soviet Union. The 




‘would be the attitude of the Soviet delegate at the meeting of the Executive Committee of F.I.F.A.’ at 
its next meeting in January 1966. Rous, ever confident of his own abilities but also supported by the 
Foreign Office adopted the role of de-facto ambassador. Edwin Bolland’s minute recorded, with 
underlining in the original, ‘Sir Stanley Rous undertook to try out the conditions above on the meeting 
and to see what their reactions would be.’ Rous, according to Bolland, expanded the role and stated 
that he would ‘try and get in touch with the President of the North Korean Football Association and 
invite him either to that meeting or to meet separately.’ This would come to pass when a North 
Korean delegation was hosted by Rous in late February in the United Kingdom with tacit Foreign 
Office approval. In all this it was agreed Rous ‘would avoid saying that these conditions were being 
laid down by the Foreign Office’.25 Here the tension between Rous as official diplomat on behalf of 
FIFA was evident as he doubled up as unofficial representative for the Foreign Office.  
Rous was therefore already playing multiple roles when the North Korean delegation visited 
England in February/March 1966. He was fulfilling his official role as FIFA president but also 
simultaneously acting as de-facto ambassador for the United Kingdom in unofficially relaying to the 
North Koreans the Foreign Office’s deliberations. Blending the official and the individual, Rous 
personally hosted the North Korean delegation by taking them to ‘a match Arsenal vs. Blackpool at 
the Arsenal Stadium’, and then ‘lunch at The Hurlingham Club on Sunday, 6th March’ while they also 
visited match venues in north-east England.26 The political sensitivity surrounding the North Korean 
delegation meant they were afforded privileges which went beyond the protocol of any normal routine 
visit by competing finalists at the time. However, this did not prevent Rous relaying the Foreign 
Office line on the nomenclature that would be used for their country through the World Cup. Rous 
explained that the team and football association would be referred to as ‘from North Korea’ despite 
the request that their country be called the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Rous noted in his 
report, ‘I explained that in England we thought of Korea being two countries, North and South; 
Germany being East and West and Ireland North and South, but in official documents their country 
would be given their appropriate title (perhaps in brackets).’27 There is no direct record of a response 
from the North Koreans to Rous’s advice, but a memo by Bolland noted ‘Sir Stanley explained our 




accepted this quite calmly’.28 From there the matters of the anthems and the nomenclature ceased to 
be an issue for Rous or for Whitehall with Rous noting that the North Koreans had no problems over 
the agreed arrangements for the national anthems, which they saw as reasonable, nor with the ‘fact 
that their team would be known as the North Koreans’.29  
While Rous and his Foreign Office contacts could feel satisfied with the outcome on anthems 
and language, the issue of national flags remained contentious. This was no surprise to those in 
Whitehall and to Rous. Bolland had written a memo to his Foreign Office colleague Arthur de la Mare 
on 1 March explaining that he had spoken to ‘Sir Stanley Rous this morning before he met the North 
Koreans and told him that Ministers had examined the compromise about flag flying’.30 There are two 
points of note here: firstly Rous spoke with a senior Foreign Office official immediately prior to 
meeting the North Koreans; and secondly, the formula put forward from these discussions - reflecting 
the Foreign Office’s broader Cold War concerns in giving the North Korean flag an unwarranted level 
of prominence - was to remove the DPRK flag despite FIFA protocol being for all flags of the 
participating nations to be flown at all stadia throughout the tournament. According to Bolland ‘Rous 
commented at once that he did not like this as it discriminated against the North Koreans and he felt 
sure that when they heard of this ruling they would react strongly against it. I said that I must agree 
with what he had said’. Importantly in comprehending Rous’s diplomacy, Bolland suggested to Rous 
that he engage with the sports minister Denis Howell, or respected civil servant Sir John Lang, having 
already informed the latter that he may receive a call from Rous.  
 Illustrative of the diplomatic practice at hand here, it is worth triangulating Rous’s 
relationship with Foreign Office officials with his relationship with Sir John Lang. Lang was to prove 
an effective foil to assist in resolution of the flags episode and a perfect institutional ally for Rous at 
the interface of official and informal diplomacy in the resolution of the delicate North Korea 
question.31 Denis Howell later wrote that Lang, as a veteran of British public life was the perfect 
accomplice for having sport recognised within the political system: 
[Lang] had served Winston Churchill in the war and he could not have been held in 
higher esteem throughout Whitehall. Wherever Sir John went, at any level of 




Rous’s diplomatic practice was to gain much from his dealings with an operator of such pedigree, as 
Lang channelled the Foreign Office line to Rous. In his conversation with Bolland on 1 March, Rous 
said ‘he would wait until after he had spoken to the Koreans before speaking to Mr Howell’, 
telephoning Bolland later on in the morning to report that ‘his conversation with the Koreans. …had 
gone very well.’ By this stage Bolland had concluded, after consultations with colleagues, that ‘the 
ball was now at Sir Stanley Rous’ feet and that it was up to him to persuade Mr. Howell that the 
arrangement … was discriminatory against the North Koreans and that he would not be able to put it 
to them’. Rous had formulated his response. Bolland wrote to his Foreign Office counterparts Arthur 
de La Mare and Lord Walston ahead of Rous hosting the North Koreans for the Arsenal match. 
Bolland stated that Rous had ‘repeated what he had said to me that he was sure that the North Koreans 
would not wear any discrimination on flag flying.’ According to Bolland’s memo, Rous then said, so 
illustrating the latter’s agency, that he ‘had therefore decided himself when discussing this question 
with the Koreans before their departure that he would say no final decision had yet been taken on the 
question of flags but that some arrangement would probably be made in line with the non-
discriminatory compromise that we had agreed.’33  
The compromise brokered by Rous suggested that national flags of all the competing 
countries would be flown at the opening match, and at regional matches the flags of the four countries 
in the group would be flown at the two grounds. At quarter-final games the flags of all eight quarter-
finalists would be flown; at semi-finals, those of all four semi-finalists: at the ‘Loser’s Final’ all four 
semi-finalists’ flags would be flown, and at the Final itself ‘the flags of all competing finalists would 
be flown’. The compromise between Foreign Office prerogatives and FIFA’s position reflected the 
belief that the North Korean team would not stay in the competition very long for its flag to gain great 
exposure, and that the flag would appear relatively anonymously at the first and final matches of the 
tournament. 
Shortly after meeting the North Koreans on 5-6 March 1966, Rous and Lang met with sports 
minister Howell. After which, and demonstrating the multi-directional nature of the diplomacy at 
hand, Lang wrote to Bolland at the Foreign Office, copying in Rous, Howell and John Harris (the 




They made it clear that they understood that the usual arrangement, hallowed by long usage, 
was that all the flags of competing countries were flown during the whole of the final series 
of matches and that they [FIFA] could not agree to any variation of this unless it were clear 
that what was proposed applied to all participants and was accepted by all. In other words 
they were suspicious and difficult.34 
The suspicions of the Koreans as relayed by Rous to Bolland and Howell, with Lang operating as foil 
for both parties, proved instrumental in the Minister’s backtracking and acceptance of the FIFA 
position that ‘all flags should be flown on all occasions’. Lang confirmed that Howell ‘accepts Rous’s 
view that FIFA cannot be expected to accept the discriminatory solution and insists that all flags on 
all occasions is the only possible solution. He emphasised that he has given way on the national 
anthem point (which originally he was inclined to press for) and urges that the F.O. should keep “their 
part of the bargain”.’35 In this Rous’s role had slipped from relaying a Foreign Office position to 
advocating on behalf of FIFA, illustrating the tension between his official and informal undertakings. 
Lang also wrote to Harris enclosing a copy of the letter to Bolland. This was done ‘at the request of 
Mr. Howell’, and in a covering note Lang summarised the ‘background of this problem’ from its 
emergence in November 1965 through to the resolution in the late Spring of 1966.36 A key focus in 
this overview was on Foreign Office insistence that all flags could not be flown at all seven grounds 
for all matches, ‘particularly having regard to the repercussions on the East Germany situation’. Lang 
noted to Bolland that Howell would not accept this Foreign Office position, and what had transpired 
was further talks between Howell and Lord Walston, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 
The outcome of the Howell and Walston exchanges was that the FIFA principle Rous had argued for 
with Howell of flying all flags across all the stadia was, eventually, supported across both the 
Ministry of Sport in the Department of Education and Science and the Foreign Office.  
A combination of Rous’s mediation with the North Korean’s and advocacy to Howell was 
essential to the resolution of the flag issue. On 25 March Bolland wrote to Rous confirming that the 
Foreign Office would ‘raise no further objection to the flying of the North Korean flag at all matches’, 
though concerns about how to explain this to the West Germans and the South Koreans meant that 




governmental departments is a complex story; it involved to a far greater degree than previously 
recognised Rous’s diplomatic role as a critical mediator and advocate, working with a key interlocutor 
in Lang whose insight, guidance and influence allowed Rous and FIFA’s views to prevail. 
In contrast to his heavily typed ‘Dear Bolland’ when writing to his Whitehall colleague, Lang 
deployed a respectful and intimate long-hand ‘Dear Stanley’ in a summative communication, dated 28 
March, explaining how the resolution had been achieved. The veteran civil servant noted the Foreign 
Office’s compromise that would now permit competing countries’ flags, including North Korea’s, to 
be flown at all the matches was on two conditions ‘accepted by Mr Howell in a packaged deal’.38 The 
North Korean issue was therefore resolved with a compromise that allowed the Foreign Office and 
FIFA to move forward, with Rous writing to Bolland stating he was sure that Lang would be ‘pleased 
that it [the North Korea issue] has been settled satisfactorily especially as [the] Minister held such 
strong views’.39 As if to confirm to himself the role he had played, Rous noted – with a palpable 
degree of self-satisfaction – to his secretary general Dr Helmut Käser at Zurich’s FIFA office (29 
March 1966) that his time with the North Koreans had been well spent: ‘I can assure you that the visit 
was successful’, he wrote with almost pedantic emphasis. Equally, he had reported to both the 
Foreign Office and FIFA that the North Korean delegates left expressing ‘their thanks for all the 
attention which had been given to them … that they had been deeply impressed with all they had seen 
in England’.40 Lang’s concluding remarks to Rous illustrate the lack of profile Whitehall officialdom 
wanted to give to the whole North Korean episode. ‘In my view all this should receive a minimum 
publicity, if it is possible so to arrange’.41  
Reflecting the global implications of the Cold War for the Foreign Office the North Korean 
issue could not be dealt with in isolation, as the response to the refusal of requests for visas for GDR 
sport journalists – conveyed by telegram from Berlin on 11 July 1966 – was to show.42 The Foreign 
Office insisted that the compromise Rous had helped broker could ‘in no way provide a precedent for 
any future visits to this country by East German teams and this has been made clear to the Department 
of Education and Science, who are responsible for matters of sport’.43 The Foreign Office Western 
Department was committed to a hard line on the question of East Germany in relation to the 1966 




in Cold War style by deliberately not acknowledging the request. The telegram reported on a meeting 
the GDR’s ‘presidium’ of its sport journalists’ association had held on 7 July in Berlin, called to 
respond to the refusal of visas for their members who had been promised straightforward access and 
working conditions by the ‘British organizers’.44 Avery Brundage the American President of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) was supportive of their rights to cover the tournament, and as 
the GDR’s journalist association’s president Felix Livetan noted had written to the international 
association of sport journalists in March calling for equal treatment and access for all approved 
journalists. The telegram from Berlin played up the lack of the ‘traditional British concept of fair-
play’ in ‘this unsportive act’. The response was unequivocal. A prompt minute stated that although 
the issue had ‘elicited notice in The Times’, ‘No action’ was required. The ambassador at the West 
German embassy was updated on the situation in a memorandum from A.H. Campbell, dated 18 July, 
confirming that ‘we did not send a reply to this communication; and nor shall we do so’.45         
Not all diplomatic challenges could be overcome or resolved with the compromise that was 
struck between FIFA protocol and the Foreign Office’s concerns in response to the North Korea issue. 
In achieving this compromise Rous’s networking and informal diplomatic interventions were 
significant. His practice and the Foreign Office’s concerns may have been tested further had the North 
Korean team, already having overachieved by defeating former World Champions Italy 1-0, held on 
to its 3-0 lead in the quarter final match against Portugal. However, Portugal’s rally to win 5-3 meant 
their progression, and the Foreign Office and Rous had avoided the prospect of a match between 
North Korea and England in the semi-final at Wembley.46  
That the North Koreans were present at the 1966 World Cup at all was in part due to the 
withdrawal from the qualifying stages of the competition of all of Africa’s national associations. The 
boycott of the World Cup competition by the African confederation was a diplomatic challenge on 
another scale for Rous, a diplomatic world away from the well-oiled networks of his English base and 
milieu. The African question emanated from the emergence of pan-African cultural and political 
claims and aspirations generally, and the increasing international profile of the anti-apartheid 
movement. It is to this aspect of the relatively unknown and only partially told story of 1966 that the 





2. A continent withdraws: the African boycott of World Cup ’66  
In January1963 the Confédération Africaine de Football (CAF) began a five-year campaign that 
culminated in 1968 with FIFA’s allocation of a guaranteed place in the World Cup Finals for an 
African country. Their tool which saw pan-African politics and sport meld together was a boycott of 
the 1966 World Cup tournament by all its members. This was announced in July 1964 and came into 
force that October. The only boycott in the competition’s history pre-empted the more widely known 
Cold War-inspired Olympic Games boycotts of 1980 and 1984. Rous’s position as FIFA president 
during this period placed him at the centre of this story. His response to the biggest African question 
of the time, apartheid in South Africa, has been critiqued as being pro-apartheid in his stubborn and 
naïve support for the white-dominated South African Football Association. This was a decisive factor 
in his defeat when he stood for re-election as FIFA president a decade later in 1974.47 Whilst Rous’s 
blind-spot on the South African issue is undeniable, a closer look at his relationship with the emergent 
African confederation, particularly concerning the allocation of World Cup places, throws a more 
nuanced light upon the nature of his dealings with the forces of pan-Africanism of the time.   
Rous sought to navigate the politics of a de-colonizing world and achieve his and FIFA’s 
developmental goals through his model of diplomacy. He was a confirmed and consistent champion 
of the development of continental confederations that would be both autonomous organisations, and 
recognised as affiliated to the world governing body FIFA. At its first full conference in Cairo, Egypt 
in January 1963, key players emerged in CAF who would contribute to events in 1966. At that 
Extraordinary General Assembly CAF brought 23 national associations together ‘to take part [in] the 
works of a real constituent assembly. Sir Stanley Rous, the President of FIFA, was present’.48 CAF, 
the first pan-African organisation – preceding the Organisation of African Unity by six years – had 
been initiated after a meeting of African delegates to the FIFA Congress in Lisbon in 1956. The 
following year on 21 June 1957, FIFA’s executive committee in Zurich approved the CAF statutes 
and the African confederation came was formally recognised. Earlier in 1957, the first CAF-promoted 
international competition had been launched in Sudan with just three teams competing, Egypt and 




refused to present a multi-racial team’.49 CAF’s early meetings – labelled General Assemblies – took 
place alongside FIFA’s Congress, but were little more than an extended executive group as many 
African national associations lacked the resources and funding to attend such meetings. The 
Extraordinary General Assembly of 1963 was therefore a transformative moment as CAF’s second 
president since 1958, Egyptian General Abdelaziz Mostafa, secured his government’s support to 
cover the travel and subsistence expenses of all 23 delegations. Mostafa’s success here reflected two 
factors: the Egyptian football federation’s support for a CAF headquarters to be located in Cairo, and 
the broader inspiration under Gamal Nasser for Egypt to be a focal point for pan-Arab and pan-
African leadership. Mostafa chaired the pivotal 1963 meeting, and in the hitherto neglected minutes of 
this formative event, oversaw the unanimous and ‘heartily acclaimed’ election of two vice-presidents 
of the confederation: Ohine Djan of Ghana, and Ydnekatchew Tessema of Ethiopia.50 Both were to 
play vital roles in the African boycott of the 1966 football World Cup tournament.  
The boycott was in many ways a logical extension of the emergent forces of pan-Africanism 
of the mid-twentieth century.51 The initiative of newly-independent countries show a prolific level of 
international collaboration with a distinct growth in cross-continental association and organisation. It 
was from 15-22 April 1958 that the First Conference of Independent African States was held in 
Accra, with eight nations in attendance.52 South Africa was the only independent state not to 
participate. Their absence was to be significant for the published goals of the conference, and 
ultimately for the 1966 boycott. Alongside goals to emancipate the continent, to be neutral and 
unaligned in relation to the ‘two antagonistic blocs in the world’, and to work towards a ‘fundamental 
unity’ between African states, a resolution condemning racism was also passed. This resolution urged 
all African states to ‘take vigorous measures to eradicate, where they arise, vestiges of racial 
discrimination’.53 This broad manifestation of pan-African thinking was reinforced by Ghanaian 
President Kwame Nkrumah’s words that the aspiration of the pan-African movement was ‘the total 
liberation of Africa’.54 Wallerstein, and others since, saw such ambitions as major political 





It did not take long for the mix of sport and politics to emerge as part of the continent-wide 
struggle for pan-African goals, particularly in the African response to apartheid South Africa. In the 
same month as Commonwealth leaders gathered in London, and South African Prime Minister H.R. 
Verwoerd withdraw the newly formed South African Republic from the Commonwealth, the third All 
African Peoples Conference met in Cairo in March 1961.56 The most notable outcome was a 
‘Resolution on South Africa’, covering boycotting of South African goods and severing of diplomatic 
relations, and, in its final clause, football. The resolution stated that the conference ‘welcomes the 
move for barring South Africa from the Federation of International Football Associations, and urges 
the formation of the All-African Sports Federation.’57 Such a clause had dual goals: to up the pressure 
on FIFA to address South Africa’s discriminatory policies, and to call for an ‘All-African’ response in 
the sphere of sport. The former was intimately related to the latter as CAF was conceived in this 
atmosphere of pan-African activism, where football was part of the broader political armory to 
address Africa’s place in the world. As such the emergence of Djan and Tessema as CAF Vice 
Presidents and their leading call to support a broader cause and boycott an international forum was a 
logical extension to sport of the commitment to pan-African solidarity. 
Ohine Djan was the key figure in Ghanaian President Nkrumah’s use of football to achieve 
diplomatic ends. Together they saw football as a platform for the nurture and assertion of 
‘Ghanaianness’, a nationalising project designed to transcend tribal divisions in Ghana, and contribute 
to the emerging pan-African ideology.58 Nkrumah blended his vision of the future with a mission to 
unite the continent: ‘His conception of Africa as encompassing one “people” and one “country” was 
premised on both traditional and modern values and principles, with both traditional and modern 
political aims’.59 Djan’s wife Matilda Adjei confirms that ‘Nkrumah encouraged him [Djan] to put 
football in Africa on the world map’.60 Djan had become chairman of the Ghanaian Amateur Football 
Association in September 1957, and de-facto Sports Minister as Director of the Central Organisation 
of Sports in 1960. He oversaw the formation of a national football league and sought international 
fixtures for a Ghanaian national side. The latter became a vanguard for African football, and in its 
nickname the ‘Black Stars’ symbolized both Africa’s football potential and aspirations and the pan-




consolidated Ghana’s place at the forefront of developments in sport and in continental pan-
Africanism.61  
Djan was appointed to FIFA’s executive committee in 1962 and the summer of 1966 should 
have been the pinnacle of his, Ghana’s and Africa’s footballing life. He was replaced though as the 
country’s director of sports and secretary of its football federation in the spring of 1966 after General 
Ankrah’s military coup of February 1966 deposed Nkrumah.62 However, by then and despite Ghana’s 
Black Stars being African champions in 1963 and 1965, CAF’s boycott was in full effect. The 
commitment to the pan-African cause trumped the desire to play at a World Cup, as the Reverend 
Osei Kofi, one of the Black Stars players, recalled 50 years later. Kofi stated ‘The World Cup, this is 
what Ohine Djan and Kwame Nkrumah made us forget about … after all Africa is bigger than 
Europe, and Nkrumah did not believe in the wider way that FIFA handled Africa. It was a cheat’.63 
Ohine Djan’s star faded fast after the end of Nkrumah’s presidency.64 Before that and with 
Nkrumah’s backing his contribution had been critical in shaping the history of his continent’s football 
diplomacy.        
In contrast to Djan, Ydne Tessema’s contribution to CAF’s diplomacy was marked by 
longevity. Tessema, from Ethiopia, was selected as president of CAF in February 1972 and held the 
position until his death in August 1987. He had been one of the founding members of CAF thirty 
years previously. In a photograph of the 15 founders he stands out; aged just 35 he was seated in the 
front row in a pair of white trousers, an open-necked white shirt topped by a casual sports jacket, 
wearing just light sandals, and a briefcase balanced between his feet.65 Later in an address to CAF’s 
25th anniversary gathering in Cairo in September 1982, Tessema expounded a personal approach to 
the diplomacy that underpinned his vision for the confederation: 
CAF considers its task as a political, social and humanitarian duty to the service of 
peace, equality and fraternity between men … a well-structured federation, solid on its 
foundations and capable to assume its mission in the framework of the building-up of a 
united and powerful Africa.66 
This is a language of transformation anchored in pan-African ideals; it contrasted with Rous’s self-




International Relations at the IOC, journalist and consultant as well as football referee, worked with 
Tessema for many years. Kidane recalled him as someone who did ‘everything for our country. He 
was not only player, translator, administrator, he was also giving courses to all of us: football 
administration, football rules and so on. He was a democrat too, he was a responsible person and 
wanted to help the development of his own country. He was sort of a visionary, reading all the time. 
There was no subject that didn’t interest him, so he knows everything’.68 The cultural and political 
possibilities of the post-colonial moment were everything for Tessema, his peoples and his continent, 
and like Djan he would use football as the vehicle for a vision of pan-African activism.  
The main focus of the pan-African vision as it impacted upon Rous, FIFA and the 1966 
World Cup was, as CAF’s historic 1963 Extraordinary General Assembly recorded, ‘The Case of 
South Africa’. Although it would be the most extensive item in the minutes it was filed under 
‘Miscellaneous’. The CAF President had invited Rous ‘to speak to the African delegates about the 
decision taken by the Executive Committee of FIFA … to lift the suspension’ of the South African 
Football Association (FASA). FIFA’s approach over the previous three years had oscillated reflecting 
the difficulties it had in addressing South Africa. When Rous become president in September 1961 
FIFA’s Executive Committee confirmed a decision to ‘decree the suspension – until further notice’ of 
the South Africa association, which it had agreed at its Rome assembly in 1960.69 When the 
Executive Committee next meet in Santiago in May 1962, it was agreed that ‘the suspension would 
remain in force’, pending the visit of a FIFA delegation to review FASA’s claims to be inclusive.70 
The investigation saw a visit by Rous and FIFA colleague Jimmy McGuire of the USA, to South 
Africa (15-19 January 1963) preceding the Cairo Assembly.71 Rous’s Executive Committee then 
supported the recommendation for South Africa’s readmission to FIFA in a 13-5 vote, and this 
provided the stimulus for CAF to campaign against the FASA within FIFA.       
The Cairo meeting was to prove a baptism of fire for Rous in FIFA’s relations with CAF. 
According to the minutes, his opening remarks were characteristically paternalistic in tone: 
Sir Rous said that in every similar organisation, any decision approved by the majority, 




decision … if the majority thought that the interest of Football in general would be in 
need of such decision.72  
Rous proposed that where there was ‘no complete unity’ they could ‘overcome all difficulties with 
cooperation and high spirit’. Delegates from across the continent lined up to question Rous about the 
FIFA Executive Committee’s intention to readmit South Africa. Rous responded tamely, pointing to 
his visit earlier in the month where he and McGuire had seen ‘no discrimination between the 
associations and the FASA is open to any association wishing to be affiliated’.73 Rous fell back on his 
increasingly antiquated viewpoint – becoming a mantra in this interrogation and elsewhere on the 
subject – of co-operation, answering ‘that the discussion would not come to any conclusion if the 
conference did not find a resolution. The South African organisations of football must help each other 
to overcome the difficulties with friendly spirit between whites and non-whites. Everybody must 
cooperate and that is always the aim of the FIFA’.74 Rous’s reliance on ‘cooperation’ betrayed a lack 
of appreciation of both the political context, that of a hastily decolonising African continent, and the 
limits to his own brand of diplomatic practice. 
McGuire, supporting Rous, sought to defend the FIFA approach and, in a tone which 
replicated Rous’s capacity to preach stated: ‘African delegates should not shut the door and must help 
the associations in South Africa, which had good sporting spirits, but [where] the Government stood 
against their wish’.75 In their remarks both McGuire and Rous sought to uphold the distinction 
between sport and politics that would allow them to say firstly that the South African association was 
distinct from political influence, and secondly, that at the same time – however paradoxical a claim – 
football could be an agent for influencing government policy.  
CAF president General Mostafa saw things differently. Mostafa asserted that the assembly 
‘had the right to make a decision according to the real situation … We, the Africans, should express 
our points of view’.76 At that point Rous and McGuire left the meeting and the discussion continued, 
the Chairman observing that ‘the case was a very important one, and the Assembly was more capable 
than the [FIFA] Executive Committee’ of giving proper consideration to the case.77 Discussions were 




thinking, and marked a paradigmatic shift away from the unifying paternalism and purportedly 
apolitical conduct of Rous: 
In view of the fact that the re-admission of South Africa Football Association (F.A.S.A.) 
which practises racialism in Football, by F.I.F.A., will mitigate against true Football 
harmony on the Continent of Africa: 
 Be it resolve, and it is hereby resolved by the bonafide members and accredited 
representatives of the African Football Confederation here assembled in Cairo on the 24th 
January 1963, that: 
1. the African Football Confederation shall have nothing to do with the F.A.S.A. until 
such time that its obnoxious apartheid policy is totally eliminated from its Set-Up, 
and operation and that 
2. our objection and dis-satisfaction be conveyed to the Executive Committee of 
F.I.F.A. with the warning that the A.F.C. proposes to table a substantive Motion for 
the complete expulsion of the South African Football Association from F.I.F.A. at 
the next Congress to be held in Tokio in 1964, if by that time the damnable 
apartheid Policy was still practised by the South African Football Association.’78  
CAF’s language was wholly different to that of Rous; of confrontation rather than compromise. Rous 
was privately irked, underlining afterwards in his copy of the minutes the words ‘damnable apartheid’ 
and adding the comment ‘not practised’. Rous’s recipe of shared spirit, co-operation and consensus 
was moribund in the context of an emergent pan-African movement. Tessema and Djan set the tone, 
and others followed such as the delegate from the U.A.R. stating ‘that the racial discrimination 
practised in South Africa could not be accepted by any human being’.79 The significance of such 
language was that at CAF’s first truly substantive and representative meeting it presented a new and 
challenging agenda for FIFA, one which explicitly brought politics to bear and required diplomacy to 
address.  
The scene was set for CAF to prove to Rous that sport and politics did mix. The assembly’s 
final decisions were to reiterate dissatisfaction with the FIFA Executive’s decision to lift the 




was totally eliminated from its modus operandi; to push for total expulsion of FASA from FIFA at the 
Tokyo 1964 Congress should discrimination still be practised at the time; and to urge African national 
associations at Tokyo to table a substantive motion for African unity. In these outcomes the 
antecedents of pan-African thinking was clear. The absence of African teams from the qualifying 
phase for a place at the 1966 World Cup Finals would be a small price to pay to achieve CAF’s 
threefold goal. First, to bring pressure to bear on FIFA to respond to South Africa’s apartheid policies; 
second, to gain a fuller recognition of the claims of CAF to have a guaranteed presence at the 1970 
World Cup Finals and beyond; and third, to contribute to pan-African identity. In sum, Rous was 
dealing with politically motivated pan-Africanists in CAF led by Djan and Tessema, protagonists 
prepared to indelibly mix sport with political causes. In this context, as the 1966 World Cup honed 
increasingly into view during 1963 and 1964, the CAF threats to Rous’s model of ‘co-operation and 
goodwill’ materialised into the only ever confederation-wide boycott of the event.  
Linking political opposition to South Africa to matters at the heart of FIFA, prior to the 1964 
Congress Djan had stepped up the pressure on FIFA in regard to the lack of any guaranteed place for 
an African team at the 1966 Finals. In a telegram from Accra on 8 February 1964 Djan wrote to 
General Secretary Helmut Käser at FIFA’s Zurich office: 
registering strong objection to unfair and unreasonable world cup arrangements for afro-
african countries stop 25 afro-asian countries struggling through painful expensive 
qualifying series for ultimate one finalist representation is pathetic and unsound stop at 
the worst Africa should have one finalist in London tournament stop urgent reconsider.80 
Tessema too pressed Africa’s case in a letter which Käser forwarded on to Rous on 19 February 1964. 
The FIFA president and its general secretary were left in no doubt that a full protest was in the offing 
yet seemed unable or unwilling to adapt and respond. Both financially and geographically, Tessema 
stated, the prospect of a match between the qualified African team and Australia appeared 
preposterous: ‘… it appears that the Afro-Asian group is a mockery of economy, politics and 
geography’; the link FIFA proposed between Asian countries and Africa, he asserted, was 
‘completely unjustified’.81 Citing also the improved level of performance and ability of African 




… that one place in the final competition be accorded to Africa who, by the number of 
Associations affiliated to FIFA, by the number entered in the World Cup competition 
1966, by the worthy results gained by national teams, by the efforts being made in each 
Association to raise the standard of football, merits greater consideration from the 
organisation whose task it is to control justly and comprehensively football throughout 
the world.82 
Käser’s covering letter to Rous conceded that although ‘some of Mr Tessema’s arguments appear to 
be reasonable’, the Ethiopian’s request could not be supported as the decision had been made by the 
1966 Organizing Committee in Zurich.83 Rous wrote back to Käser three days later confirming ‘that 
the decisions reached in Zurich can not be altered’, but that he would share Tessema’s protest with the 
Executive Committee.84 There was a hint of sympathy in Rous’s response - as his paternalism dictated 
- in noting that any political, geographical or economic difficulties arising in the later stages of the 
qualifying process might lead to the World Cup Organising Committee making some ‘possible’ 
adjustments. There was though no counter offer on the table from FIFA that might have appeased 
CAF’s concern. All was now in place for CAF to follow through with its threat to boycott. Djan had 
condemned the ‘discriminating decision of FIFA’ and recommended the withdrawal of the African 
countries in January 1964.85 The action was confirmed in a resolution adopted by CAF’s Executive 
Committee meeting in July 1964. The covering note from the CAF General Secretary Mourad Fahmy 
accompanying the Resolution said that this was for ‘all those who have at heart – both in Africa and 
elsewhere – the cause of making the World Championship a real world manifestation far from any 
exclusivism’.86 CAF was not bluffing though, and at the CAF General Assembly in Tokyo on 7 
October 1964, a unanimous vote (26 in favour) confirmed withdrawal from the World Cup. An anti-
apartheid stance opposing FIFA’s proposed reinstatement of South Africa, a pan-African mission that 
motivated the confederation’s leaders, and the unfairness of World Cup allocations combined to make 
a powerful case.  
The response from Rous and FIFA was paltry. Rous, addressing the full FIFA Congress on 8 
October after the CAF decision was taken, said that he was ‘shocked to hear that the African countries 




would be ‘most distressed’ if he were informed officially of this decision.87 Rous’s personal distress 
was not a factor in CAF’s overarching goals; his moral pleas were to no avail. 
CAF’s goals of addressing South Africa’s status, securing a place at future World Cups, and 
overarching African representation on the international stage were the core focus of the confederation. 
Indeed, when in July 1965 the FIFA Executive issued a demand that all withdrawing associations pay 
a fine of 5,000 Swiss francs Tessema issued a swift and derisory response. He argued, using language 
that Rous would recognise, that each national association in CAF ‘felt that it had renounced its most 
elementary rights and sacrificed its own interests for the sake of the unity of world football’. Tessema 
continued by laying the responsibility for the predicament at FIFA’s door:   
[CAF’s members] were [previously] convinced that the lesson would be learnt [by the 
threat of the boycott] and that they would receive justice and compensation from the 
FIFA in future international competitions. Unfortunately, on the contrary the FIFA has 
adopted a relentless attitude against the African Associations and its decisions ressemble 
[sic] methods of intimidation and repression designed to discourage any further impulses 
of a similar nature.88 
The issue of a representative allocation of a Finals place for Africa remained an unpleasant distraction 
for Rous and the FIFA Executive in the year preceding the tournament in England, and Africa was not 
officially represented on the field of play when the first ball was kicked between England and 
Uruguay at Wembley on 11 July 1966.  
African representation was however present in England in the summer of 1966. Tessema was 
an invited guest in the United Kingdom throughout the event and reported on the tournament 
subsequently to CAF’s sister confederation – the Union of European Football Associations UEFA - 
and his condemnation of FIFA was damming. Tessema wrote: 
In playing all of England’s matches at Wembley, in designating seven British referees for 
Brazil’s three games; in appointing as referees for the games England-Argentina and 
Germany-Uruguay a German and an English referee respectively; in ignoring almost 
totally referees from other continents (above all after the quarter-finals); in not 




It has not sought to place itself beyond suspicion …. so provoking, above all among its 
critics, the feeling that England got a helping hand in winning the World Cup.89 
In pointing to the allocation of referees throughout the tournament as a ‘pile of blunders’ - of 
the 32 games at the 1966 World Cup Finals, 25 were refereed by Europeans - the criticism of Rous 
was twofold.90 Explicitly Tessema was criticising FIFA’s running of the tournament, and implicitly he 
was challenging Rous as the UEFA audience knew full well that the president of FIFA was a former 
international referee. Cumulatively by pointing out that FIFA was not ‘beyond suspicion’ he was 
directly challenging Rous’s diplomacy.  
Tessema’s report was a prominent intervention, framing debates concerning the 1966 
tournament and Rous’s role in it. A successful outcome to CAF’s campaign would follow before the 
next Finals tournament in Mexico in 1970. In early 1968 Rous, attempting to illustrate his diplomatic 
skills in reconciling ‘splits’, informed the CAF General Assembly in Addis Ababa that FIFA had no 
wish to see Africa withdraw from the forthcoming 1970 World Cup qualification process. Rous stated 
that the Organising Committee for that event would include Tessema as representative for Africa. It 
would be Tessema’s task, along with other organizing committee members, to propose a ‘grouping of 
teams for the various stages of the Competition’.91 The battle had effectively been won by CAF, and 
the boycott had achieved a major goal in Africa being awarded its first dedicated qualification slot for 
future World Cups. Equally significant, the first pan-African organisation of any kind – political, 
cultural, sporting – had accomplished its initial mission to assert the continent’s rights in a post-
colonial world. ‘Right from the very beginning, this was a story about cultural politics in the post-
colonial period’: CAF, as the first pan-African organisation, had assumed a ‘geo-political role’.92 
Africa’s withdrawal from the 1966 World Cup qualifying process constitutes a unique 
continent-wide withdrawal from a major sporting occasion. It drew attention to the limitations of 
Rous’s model of diplomacy, exposing the unsuitability of his judgement when encountering the 
political realities of the decolonising era. Most of all, alone or accompanied by like-minded 
individuals in unfamiliar cultural and political settings, Rous was shown to be flawed in his 
underlying belief that FIFA could transcend politics. Rous’s continuing support for South African 




accept his argument that the football system in South Africa was open to all, and that apartheid was an 
exclusive problem of politics not sport. Kidane recalled Rous as a pleasant individual unable to 
recognise the significance of the South African issue, ‘he was very nice and very sociable with 
everybody. The only problem was when it came to South Africa’.93 So whilst many at CAF might not 
condemn Rous as a person, the Englishman’s pro-South Africa line in FIFA’s Executive Committee 
and his patronising and threatening tone at the CAF 1968 Congress, were unacceptable for the leader 
of the sport’s governing body.  
Rous’s reputation in Africa could not survive these flaws; few could forget or forgive his 
comments on CAF’s conduct at the 1968 Congress in his Presidential address. In confirming the 
allocation of the dedicated Word Cup slot for Africa, he took the opportunity to chide CAF on its 
support for possible IOC sanctions against South Africa: 
We are here concerned with football, the FIFA and the AFC [CAF], not with the I.O.C. 
and are responsible for our own decisions not for those of others. Gentlemen, making 
threats in our football family is not good legislation. The result could rebound very 
unfavourably on those who make them.94  
Rous’s diplomacy failed in this not-so-veiled threat. Even without this faux pas, his individual 
personal charm allied to an idealistic conception of FIFA’s mission and values were no match for the 
political activists to whom CAF was an agent for political and cultural change and necessary pan-
African progress. Rous’s schoolmasterly and refereeing experience and his adherence to a world view 
rooted too much upon trust and assumed loyalty were inadequate tools with which to grasp the scale 
of change that would characterise the transformations of a decolonizing world.  
 It was not only in Africa where Rous’s diplomatic qualities were critiqued. The beginnings of 
a movement which would see South American opinion turned against Rous, were also evident in 
1966, and critically for this analysis they were evident to the Foreign Office. While the forces that 
Havelange would successfully rally to defeat Rous in the 1974 presidential election would coalesce in 
the favour of the Brazilian, the lack of respect for Rous in South America after 1966 was clear. In 
early September 1966 the British embassy in Buenos Aires, in the person of Ramsey A. W. Wright, 




game at Wembley in which England defeated Argentina had been ‘that FIFA was run by three people, 
Sir, Stanley and Rous’.95 Similarly, back in the Foreign Office in London David F. Duncan 
condemned Rous’s handling of the South American criticisms in a confidential longhand note dated 
18 August, to colleague Caroline Petrie: ‘The vast majority of Latin American comment has been 
exceptionally unfavourable’, Duncan began, before concluding that ‘Sir Stanley Rous mishandled the 
whole situation in a deplorable fashion.’96 Petrie did not disagree. She had written to all 18 South 
American embassies on 12 August, referring to accusations against World Cup organizers that had 
widely emphasised that the FIFA president was British and the finals were held in England, which 
‘has meant that Britain as a whole and not merely FIFA has incurred a good deal of odium’.97  
Rous’s diplomacy was seen as less effective in the case of South America than it had been in 
relation to North Korea where he was the Foreign Office’s interlocutor in chief with the DPRK 
delegation, and also as potentially damaging to British interests. Beyond the divergent opinions of 
Rous in the Foreign Office the FIFA president’s paternalistic, eurocentric and often patronising 
practice was to become increasingly detached from the rapidly changing topography of international 
affairs in the later 1960s. The vulnerabilities of his forms of personal diplomacy became a strong 
factor in his defeat in the 1974 FIFA presidential election when Brazil’s João Havelange was elected 
as FIFA’s first non-European president.98  
 
Conclusion: The Diplomatic Tensions of 1966 
While Geoff Hurst’s impact on the World Cup Final in 1966 was unmatched with a hattrick that saw 
England lift the Jules Rimet trophy, Sir Stanley Rous’s influence on the diplomacy of the 1966 World 
Cup tournament as a whole was equally as important. His impact was felt from the outset of his FIFA 
presidency in September 1961. He practiced and preached a form of diplomacy that had been honed 
through a series of increasingly high-profile positions blending public performance and private 
discussion. This formula characterized his conduct as an international football referee in the late 
1920s and the early 1930s and his activities as secretary of The Football Association from 1934 to 
1962. Rous should have been at the peak of his influence in world football governance and 




more mixed picture. Consideration of DPRK involvement in the World Cup Finals, the ‘North Korea’ 
issue, has shown how Rous’s diplomatic practice in liaising across individual and institutional 
networks, and on behalf of the Foreign Office, could contribute effectively to the resolution of 
delicate diplomatic matters. A counter-example is provided by the boycott by African nations of the 
1966 World Cup, demonstrating how Rous’s personal philosophy of fair-play and commitment to the 
distinction between sport and politics was less effective in the post-colonial context where football 
was conceived as part of a political process for pan-Africanism.  
Following his defeat in 1974 by João Havelange for the FIFA presidency, Rous reflected on 
his reasons for having stood (at the age of 79 years) for a further term as president. Seemingly 
oblivious to the fact that the only boycott to that point, and since, in FIFA’s history took place during 
his term he noted: ‘I felt the diplomacy which had avoided any serious split in the past [i.e. his own 
diplomacy]… might still be of value to FIFA’.99 His words reveal a misguided self-rationalisation that 
was out of step with the 1974 campaign when Havelange mobilised opinion from what was then 
called the developing world to oust Rous. His words also evoke an ultimately flawed conception of 
diplomacy which was integral to his thinking from the outset of his presidency and throughout the 
diplomatic machinations of the 1966 World Cup tournament. 
It is the approach to diplomacy that Rous individually, and FIFA collectively, practiced which 
stands out in the analysis of diplomacy at the World Cup of 1966; an approach in which tensions 
between formal and informal, official and unofficial, and individual and representative diplomacy are 
highlighted. The tensions were evident in the model of diplomacy practiced by Rous and FIFA more 
widely, embodied in their belief that sport was distinct from the political reality in which it existed. 
Individuals such as Rous blended professional status and individual networks, underwritten by their 
individual style. Such an approach is shaped by the individuals’ experiences and the strategic cultural 
dispositions that they espoused. Ken Weisbrode argues, building on the identification of 
paradiplomacy in the 1990s, that when ‘para-diplomatic bodies’ - such as FIFA - ‘enter the picture 
they are important diplomatic facilitators’. Weisbrode writes: ‘By enlarging the field of diplomacy in 
this way, such organizations and the policy entrepreneurs who work for them can play several roles: 




kind’.100 An understanding of FIFA as a diplomatic actor, as exemplified in this article, supports the 
argument that the interconnected worlds of sport and diplomacy, as they become manifest in high-
profile sports events, constitute a prime venue in which the tensions of diplomacy are played out.  
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